Air Beat Magazine - Journal of the
Airborne Law Enforcement Association
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The International Helicopter Safety
Team’s slogan is...
Any Accident Is Everyone’s Accident
By Matthew S. Zuccaro
President – Helicopter Association
International
Let’s talk about safety. However, before I
do that, I want to express my sincere
appreciation to ALEA and Air Beat magazine
for allowing me this opportunity to speak
about my favorite subject, which I know is a
prime priority for ALEA members as well.
I am well aware of the various missions
performed by ALEA members, under demanding
conditions, sometimes in unforgiving
operating environments. This creates a need
for constant vigilance and attention to
details. Although we are aware of the need
for safety, we unfortunately continue to
have accidents at an unacceptable level, for
unacceptable reasons. Which brings us to the
topic at hand – safety first, everything
else second.
The International Helicopter Safety Team
(IHST) was born at the International
Helicopter Safety Symposium held in
Montreal, Canada in September 2005. This
gathering of the international helicopter
community took a hard, cold look at the
international helicopter accident rate,
found it unacceptable, and decided to do
something. The goal is simple; reduce the
international helicopter accident rate by 80
percent within the next ten years. The
actual execution is extremely complex.
The international helicopter operating
environment ranges from a small, VFR,
two-seat piston engine helicopter-up to a
large, 19-seat transport category
helicopter, in IFR conditions with a
two-pilot crew. Add to this just a few
choices from the long list of potential
helicopter missions, such as training,
logging, EMS, corporate, aerial tours,
aerial applications, utility work, offshore,
photography, and of course, airborne law
enforcement.
The IHST initiative is predicated on the
highly successful Commercial Aviation Safety
Team (CAST), which was a statistical
analysis of available accident data relating
to scheduled air carrier operations. As a
result of the CAST research, the airline
industry has, for all practical purposes,
created an almost accident-free operating
environment.
Although the task at hand for the IHST is
much more complex, and must take in numerous
variances not found in airline operations, I
sincerely believe we can achieve an 80
percent accident reduction. When I hear
reluctance to this goal as being too high, I
simply ask, “Just flip the numbers around.
Are you telling me a 20 percent accident
rate is acceptable?” In fact the number
should actually be a “0 percent” accident
rate. When we wake up each morning no
accident should be acceptable. I do not
subscribe to the theory that “Stuff just
happens. You cannot prevent everything.” If
you do not try, you will never know.
Now that we have set the goal, how do we
intend to do this? Glad you asked. The IHST,
which is a jointly sponsored effort by
Helicopter Association International and the
American Helicopter Society, is overseen by
an executive committee, of which I am
honored to serve on as one of the co-chairs.
The other co-chair is Dave Downey, manager
of the FAA Rotorcraft Directorate Office. We
have an established intent to insure the
participation of the entire international
helicopter community, predicated on the
theory that any accident is everyone’s
accident.
To date we have created two working teams, a
Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team
(JHSAT), and a Joint Helicopter Safety
Implementation Team (JHSIT). The JHSAT has
been in the process of meeting four days
each month to analyze available helicopter
accident data and to determine the trend of
causal factors, and contributory issues. The
JHSIT, having just been formed, is about to
commence a review of the initial work of the
JHSAT’s analysis process, and start the
formulation of recommended implementation
initiatives to reduce the international
helicopter accident rate.
Where do you fit in? Good question. To date
the activities of the executive committee,
the JHSAT and JHSIT have involved
participation by individuals from every
segment of the international helicopter
community to include, regulatory agencies,
helicopter operators, manufacturers,
research organizations, academia, the
military, and HAI Affiliate Members, such as
ALEA’s very own Keith Johnson, ALEA Safety
Program Manager. We are at a phase now where
various specialty-working groups will begin
to be populated with ladies and gentlemen
such as yourselves, who have expertise in
specific operating profiles. In your case,
airborne law enforcement, and the many
associated mission activities you conduct on
a day-to-day basis. These working groups
will assist the IHST in our review of the
data and formulation of recommendations, a
reality check, as I like to call it. Open
participation will also be fostered via the
Internet, by allowing anyone interested in
the IHST initiative to go to our Web page at
WWW.IHST.ORG, review the program, and post
your thoughts.
While I have the opportunity, let me impart
some of my personal thoughts regarding this
effort. I believe the greatest challenge for
IHST will be the presentation of the
cost/benefit analysis or business case, to
those involved in the ownership, management,
production, flight, maintenance, and use of
helicopters. It is our responsibility to
clearly demonstrate that there is not only a
humanitarian incentive in preventing
accidents, in terms of the elimination of
fatalities and injuries, but a strong
business case to be made for a cultural
mindset change with regard to safety.
Bottom line-no accidents, no fatalities or
injuries, which is the primary driver for
this effort. However, we must also realize
that such efforts regarding safety
enhancement initiatives, also involve the
potential of additional costs, which is a
legitimate concern to commercial operators
having to insure the financial health of
their organization, and competitiveness in
the open market. This also includes the
education of the client base, who must pay
for our services.
I sincerely believe we can demonstrate that
the return on investment relating to initial
economic outlay for safety initiatives can
reduce the actual costs, and increase
revenues over the long term, when you
consider the many negative effects of a
helicopter accident, outside the loss of
persons and aircraft. Some of these
additional detrimental effects of an
accident include, loss of the aircraft as a
revenue-producing asset, negative perception
of the helicopter industry by the general
public, clients, regulatory agencies,
insurance industry, and the press. All of
this resulting in strong opposition to
requests for heliports, new or expanded
operations, and airspace access. Also,
higher insurance rates, high judgments from
litigation, a reluctance from the client
base to continue the use of helicopters, or
a decision not to use helicopters by
potential new clients that we do not even
know about. Simply stated, “If you think the
cost of safety is too high, consider the
cost of an accident.”
In the end, guys like me can preach all we
want, and people like you can agree safety
is a good thing. However, until we all truly
believe safety is first, second to nothing,
and practice this cultural mindset every day
without waiver, we are not going to be
successful. In the reality of operating
helicopters that means we have to be willing
to set the standards and not blink. It means
we might not be able to complete every
flight or assigned mission. For commercial
operators, you might have to walk away from
a contract or client that demands service
without attention or regard to safety. For a
corporate operator, you might not be able to
get the boss to that critical meeting, and
he might not be a happy camper in some
cases. For the aerial tour operator, you
might not be able to make that ride as
dramatic and inclusive as you want, but you
will still be able to deliver a life-long
memory to the customer. For the EMS
operator, it is possible that the child
waiting to be airlifted might not make it
without your transport. However, you will
not cause the loss of additional life due to
your sincere concern for the patient by
using faulty aeronautical decision-making.
Let us never forget our ultimate mission,
much like the medical community, is “do no
harm”. Be mindful we cannot complete every
mission, but those we do perform can and
should be done safely. If we get everyone
onboard, we can succeed.
As always, let me know what you think. I
would sincerely appreciate your comments and
thoughts, just forward them to me at
TAILROTOR@AOL.COM. Remember to fly safely
and neighborly.
To the ladies and gentlemen of ALEA, you
have my sincere appreciation and respect for
what you do everyday on behalf of all of us
– thank you.
Matthew Zuccaro is the President of
HAI. During his 35-year aviation career, he
has held several executive level and
operations management positions with
commercial, corporate, air tour, scheduled
airline and public service helicopter
operations in the northeastern U.S.
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Assessing & Managing Risks
By Keith Johnson
ALEA Safety Program Manager
Risk management is the identification and control of
risk. Good risk management minimizes risk to an acceptable level when
weighed against the benefit of completing the mission. It’s the most
important thing we do. Risk management is everyone’s job and is the key to
safe, professional operations.
Safety principles that provide the foundation for managing risk
include:
-
Always operate in the safest manner possible.
-
Never take unnecessary risks.
-
Safe does not mean risk free.
-
The key to safety is the identification and management
of risk.
AIRCREW
There are five elements of risk and general ‘rules of thumb’ to consider.
This includes knowledge, skill, judgment and experience. With regard to
aircrews, for example, there should be minimum experience standards that
should be met prior to assigning new personnel to the night shift. There
should be more frequent proficiency training (check rides) for new pilots
and tactical flight officers. Inexperienced personnel should not generally
be assigned together. When most new personnel are assigned to law
enforcement aviation units, they generally have little, if any, experience.
Most could not get a job in the aviation industry. Training is the only
substitute for experience.
AIRCRAFT
Performance limitations, operation in the height-velocity curve, fuel state,
suitability of aircraft configuration for performing the mission,
maintenance compliance and airworthiness, and accelerated wear must be
continually be evaluated.
ENVIRONMENT
This includes weather, terrain, surface obstructions and other aircraft in
the area of operation. Ceiling and visibility standards should be increased
for night operations.
MISSION
This includes tactical incident management, surveillance, transportation,
rescue, command and control and firefighting; all have different
requirements including the necessary training and equipment required to
safely perform these missions.
MANAGEMENT
No matter their experience, management always has the responsibility of
assessing whether to perform a mission or abort. In modern accident
investigation, management’s role and responsibility is always assessed.
Management is responsible for ensuring that appropriate written standards
are in place that address safety, training, operations, organization,
maintenance and administration. (The ALEA Standards can be used as a guide.)
The importance of having primary and recurrent training
for the missions being performed cannot be overemphasized. Too often, the
excuse for not performing necessary training is that it’s too expensive. Try
having an accident. If you’re lucky, you only destroy a $2-3 million
aircraft. If you’re not so lucky, you have people seriously injured or
killed. Now things get really expensive.
When it comes to training, there is a choice, but only
one right choice. If you think you can roll the dice and hope you don’t have
an accident, you are only denying the inevitable. Wishing and hoping is just
that. It won’t prevent an accident.
In managing risk, you must identify hazards, assess the
hazards, develop controls to minimize or eliminate risk, implement controls
and constantly assess hazards associated with the mission.
Most of us have probably heard someone say, “I have been
doing it this way forever, and I have never had an accident.” I suggest that
an absence of accidents does not necessarily equate to safety. Furthermore,
familiarity and prolonged exposure without a mishap leads to a loss of
appreciation of risk. We tend to assume that because nothing has happened,
we are doing it right. The 26 people killed and the 118 injured in law
enforcement accidents since 1999 probably didn’t take off thinking they
could have an accident. And, they probably thought they were doing things
right. We tend to think that having an accident is always going to happen to
the other guy.
Sixty percent of law enforcement accidents occur as a result of human error
and loss of control. Many accidents occur due to a convoluted belief of
mission urgency and risk taking, causing judgment errors.
We are all subject to making such mistakes. Perhaps when
we start flying, we start with a bag full of luck and a bag of experience.
The trick is to fill up the bag of experience before the bag of luck runs
out. So, what is the problem, and what are we going to do about it?
Judgment and action errors are at the source of most
accidents. Therefore, all organizations must eliminate the motivation that
causes people to be too focused on performing the mission and not focused
enough on safety. The key to managing risk and eliminating accidents
requires the following:
-
Taking a proactive approach to accident elimination.
-
Focusing more attention on flying the aircraft and on
managing risk.
-
Learning to follow established procedures.
Managers must recognize that reinforced bad behavior
breeds continued bad behavior. Managers must ask, “Are we rewarding the
right people?” Intentional non-compliance with the rules generally does not
result in an accident, but it always results in greater risk. The
organization must eliminate the motivation that causes people to break the
rules by having a positive, healthy safety culture. We need to learn to do
the right thing, for the right reasons, at the right time, every time.
We must always beware of the “can do syndrome.”
Rationalization of the gravity of the situation seems to lessen risk in our
minds, but in reality, it does not. Any change in the risk associated with
accomplishing the mission requires the reassessment of risk. We must make a
distinction between a body recovery and a rescue. We must not fall prey to
the expectations of others, including higher ranking officers, politicians,
the public, peers and even self-pressure.
Poor crew resource management is often a contributing
factor in accident causation. While the pilot ultimately bears the
responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft, the tactical flight
officer or other non-pilot crewmembers have an equal say when it comes to
safety and the decision whether to attempt or continue the mission. The EMS
industry has adopted the following policy, “It takes three to go, and one to
say no.” Any crewmember must be able to abort the mission based upon safety
considerations.
We need to identify unsafe flight profiles, including
overestimating crew qualifications, the operating environment, mission
requirements and aircraft suitability. Pilots need to spend more time flying
the aircraft and managing risk and less time focused on the mission. The TFO
is generally the one charged with managing the operation, not the pilot.
In assessing aircraft suitability, it is important to
recognize that most of the aircraft operated by law enforcement are light,
single-engine aircraft. This makes aircraft performance an important issue
most of the time. When we add people and equipment beyond a crew of two,
(e.g. rescue, personnel transportation and airborne use of force to name a
few), we are operating at or near the limits of the aircraft’s capability.
This requires careful consideration when deciding what sort of missions the
organization is going to perform.
One of the reasons we are in the law enforcement business
is that we are mission oriented. This is good, but we must be careful not to
become too task oriented at the expense of good risk management procedures.
We must remember that even the simplest mission has risk. I read in a recent
edition of Heliprops that manager John Williams of Bell Helicopter stated,
“The helicopter has absolutely no respect for the number of years I have
flown or the fact that I have an ATP rating. It can be an equal opportunity
killer. I keep that in mind every time I crank the engine.” This is
something we should all consider. And, it is equally applicable to
fixed-wing aircraft.
At the foundation of good risk management is attitude.
Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, “What lies behind us and what lies before us are
tiny matters compared to what lies within us.” People are the key to
managing risk and eliminating accidents. We must focus on making good
decisions. Going home at the end of our shift should be our highest
priority, not the mission. A bad guy that escapes today will be caught
tomorrow.
If you think that risk management gets in the way of
accomplishing the mission, the opposite is true. Managing risk, more often
than not, enables us to accomplish the mission. And, if after considering
all of the risks we cannot manage risk to an acceptable level compared to
the benefit achieved from accomplishing the mission, we should not attempt
or continue the mission. By managing risk and making good decisions,
accidents can be eliminated.
(Back to top)
Create A Safety Culture
By Jay Fuller
ALEA Safety Staff
Most of us already understand that safety works and
safety programs are necessary to ensure continuance of and compliance with
safety efforts. A defined mission with written goals and objectives are the
anchor for your safety program. The mission of any aviation safety program
is simply to eliminate mishaps (i.e. accidents and incidents). Nothing short
of this is acceptable. Perfection is not something we expect to achieve on a
continuing basis, but assigning this as a mission ensures that efforts will
always be made, regardless of our success rate. Let’s identify who should be
in charge of your unit’s safety program and why.
Who is the Safety Officer?
The safety officer is the heart of a unit’s safety program. This is a staff
position, which means the individual(s) assigned have no line authority. He
or she is selected by and reports directly to the unit chief (not to
operations) and derives authority from the unit chief. In small units, where
the unit chief is functionally the head of operations, this situation must
be addressed through the relationship of the two individuals.
The safety officer provides internal unit oversight,
which is not compatible with line supervisory responsibility. However, it is
entirely appropriate for the safety officer to be a line pilot or a line
tactical flight officer. In large aviation units, it may be feasible to have
a purely administrative position. Knowing and understanding the day-to-day
work of aviation crews is crucial to being effective in the job of unit
safety officer.
Who are Good Safety Officer Candidates?
Potential safety officers should be interviewed with specific duties in mind
and selected by the unit chief based on their interest in safety, line
experience, credibility within the organization, good people skills, a
willingness to do administrative program work and mutual trust with the unit
chief.
The safety officer is dependent on the unit chief for
authority, and the unit chief is dependent on the safety officer to provide
much of the internal unit oversight. The latter means that on occasion a
safety officer must be able to tell the unit chief things he or she doesn’t
want to hear. Consequently, there must be complete confidence and trust
within the relationship.
Once selected, the safety officer and unit chief should
agree on an initial duty set, reasonable job objectives and a reduced
operational workload for the safety officer in order to make time for
increased administrative responsibilities.
How Much Time Should a Safety Officer Commit?
Under most circumstances, the safety officer position is a four to six year
job. Over this time frame, most people start losing the energy and
motivation it takes to maintain a proactive program. At the same time,
personnel within the flying unit will become somewhat immune to messages
from the same individual. After a tour as safety officer, it is very
reasonable for an individual to return to line function or gravitate into
command, depending on the needs of the organization. Not only does it
provide new blood and new ideas, it increases the number of unit personnel
having experience with and an appreciation for the safety program.
Who Should Know About the Position?
Once selected, the safety officer must be appointed in a very public way.
The unit chief should make a formal announcement at some unit staff meeting,
specifying some of the duties and affirming that the safety position has
full support of his or her office. This should be backed up by a memo
outlining the same information for individuals not present, for outlying
stations, if any, and for future reference. This same memo should be
up-channeled by the unit chief to higher agency headquarters for
distribution to both command and staff personnel.
Should We Establish a Safety Committee?
If the safety officer is the heart of a safety program, the safety committee
is the brain. Since the safety officer is appointed by the unit chief, the
safety committee should be as well. Committee members should be selected so
that all identifiable aspects of the aviation unit are represented. This is
easier than it sounds. In the small unit where staffing may be a problem,
individual members typically wear multiple hats anyway. The safety officer
will be the chair and typically can represent flight operations. Other prime
candidates would be additional flight ops personnel, senior maintenance,
line maintenance and line service personnel (depending on the size of the
unit and breadth of missions). Beyond this, if service such as fueling is
provided under contract, contractor personnel would be qualifiers.
Significant aviation user groups, either inside or outside the police
agency, would be another source. It isn’t necessary that committee members
be aviation unit assigned.
The criterion for selection is regular involvement with
aviation unit activities and a “stake” in the unit or its missions. Using
non-unit assigned personnel also relieves the staffing burden for small
aviation units.
Do Meetings Enhance Communications?
Meetings should be held on a regular, scheduled basis. Semiannual meetings
are a realistic, workable minimum. As chair, the safety officer or their
designee should make up the agenda. Agenda items should be sought out from
the other committee members and unit personnel if the opportunity and unit
structure permits. Advertise meetings at least a month in advance. It
doesn’t hurt to poll individual committee members and unit supervisors ahead
of time about potential dates to avoid conflicts with vacations, training or
scheduled unit actions.
Keep meetings structured and adhere as much as possible to a firm time
schedule, as attention levels tend to drop after about two hours. The chair
needs to maintain control, since efforts to elicit input often bring out the
“soap boxes.” Have someone serve as recorder to document meetings. Start off
with open items from the previous meeting, continue with new agenda items
and finish with any input from the floor.
How Should We Get the Word Out?
After the meeting, write up the minutes and brief the unit chief and other
supervisors as appropriate. If the committee came to specific conclusions so
that recommendations involve action by management, make sure that all
details are covered and the basis for conclusions is clear. In this case, it
would be best to have two or more of the committee members available during
the briefing. Once all issues have been settled between the committee and
management, the minutes should be made available to all personnel. Since
some of the issues discussed may be sensitive, either within or outside the
unit, a summary of issues covered would be permissible. For recommendations
that have been accepted by management, implementation becomes a line
responsibility.
Why Should We Follow Through with Initiatives?
Following up and monitoring directives from the safety committee, either
directly or through line management, is a safety function. The three most
important factors to ensure the implementation and effectiveness of safety
program efforts are follow up, follow up and follow up. This means ensuring
(along with line management) that all prescribed actions are in fact taking
place, monitoring to see these actions are generating the desired result and
if they aren’t, calling for modification or even elimination of the action
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Night Missions - Operating Low & Slow
By Paul Osterman
American Eurocopter
Safely operating a helicopter in the areas where they
provide their greatest benefit – the low and slow environment – requires
being fully aware of many factors. Helicopter pilots achieve this state,
known as “situational awareness,” primarily though visual reference.
Hoisting operations, search and rescue operations and even normal patrol
activities require that a helicopter pilot be aware of obstacles, flight
paths to avoid those obstacles and the movement of the helicopter, all of
which must be recognized visually.
Therein is the problem. During night operations, the
visual system is incapable of maintaining the necessary situational
awareness for helicopter pilots to be able to perform the low and slow
mission safely. Fortunately, through the use of modern night vision goggles
(NVGs), pilots can overcome this visual deficiency during night operations.
The absolute safest way to deal with night operations is
simply not to go. This has been the operating procedure for many law
enforcement agencies where the risk of operating at night in certain
locations was simply too dangerous to accept because of poor visual acuity
or dangerous obstacles. Modern NVG technology has started to change this
fact by allowing helicopter crews to have more visual references and
increase their situational awareness. In areas where pilots previously had
no visual references, NVGs produce an acceptable visual picture where not
only are the obstacles visible, but so is the surrounding terrain.
NVGs, however, are not a perfect solution to the problem
of night visual acuity, and they come with limitations. This is where the
aviation managers in today’s law enforcement agencies need to fully educate
themselves before either turning down NVGs or embracing the technology. It
is paramount that they look at what capabilities they wish their
organization to have and how they can safely perform them. If they are about
to embark on a modernization program for their department, then NVGs should
be evaluated as a possible solution to night deficiencies.
Properly modified cockpit lighting with current NVG
technology and properly trained crews could give most agencies a safe way to
approach new night missions or capabilities. For those agencies looking to
add new night missions to their operations, especially away from urban
areas, then NVGs should be considered. Education remains the key in this
process, so managers should seek out other agencies that have already
obtained this new technology and learn from their experience, or contact any
of the certified training schools for additional information or a
demonstration.
Gaining NVG capability should include three things
necessary for a safe program: modern goggles, helicopter lighting
modification and crew training.
To be able to provide the safest capability, it is
necessary to include modern NVGs. These come by many different names and
designations, and decision makers need to ensure that they purchase current
high quality goggles. ITT and Litton build military grade devices, and these
should be considered first. You will hear names like ANVIS-6(V3),
ANVIS-6(V3)-gen4, ANVIS-9, M-949, Pinnacles and others. PVS-5, PVS-7 and
ANVIS-6 designations refer to older generation or non-aviation NVGs, which
are unacceptable and unsafe for most urban or near-urban operations. Seek a
reputable dealer or inquire with a certified NVG training school for
additional information before purchasing any generation night vision goggle.
Older night vision goggles have poor visual acuity and respond poorly to
changing light situations.
The second part is making sure you have a compatible
cockpit lighting arrangement. Taping over gauges or radio displays, or
simply turning off interior or instrument lights is not a truly safe way to
fly with NVGs. A properly arranged and compatibly lit cockpit makes it easy
for a pilot to quickly see important displays when rapidly peering under
their goggles. Requiring a pilot to use a lip light or flashlight to gain
visibility with an essential display requires more “inside” time, and
everything should be done to minimize the time a pilot has to spend inside,
as it reduces time spent gaining situational awareness outside. During this
modification process, consider converting exterior lights to modern LED
versions, which provide a bit more compatibility to NVGs and are less likely
to burn out or fail. The best way to obtain the safest aircraft and
instrument lighting is to seek out a company with an approved supplemental
type certificate for NVG lighting. This will ensure a system that has been
approved by the FAA.
The final and most important part of this process is
training. NVGs have limitations. Pilots need to be taught and shown these
limitations. Modern NVGs have an amazing view, and it is easy to think that
one can just slap a mount on their helmet and go use these devices, but to
do so would be dangerous. While they restore central vision, which for all
practical purposes is blind at night, NVGs take away almost 160 degrees of
peripheral vision. To compensate for this, a pilot must learn to scan
constantly during flight. This is not a natural process and requires
training.
Additionally, while there are two tubes, NVGs do not
provide depth perception; the eye is simply focusing on a green image inches
from the eye. The eye together with the brain can learn to interpret depth
from NVGs, but it takes time and training to learn the new cues. Pilots also
need to experience what the night vision goggles can not do for them, like
see wires or fences, items of similar contrast or the loss of discrimination
when the goggles have auto-gained due to a bright light in their 40 degree
field-of-view. A properly trained pilot will know all of this and will not
allow these limitations to decrease their situational awareness.
Seek out an FAR-141 certified school for proper training.
This isn’t to say that schools or instructors without FAR-141 certification
provide poor or inadequate training, but a certified school has taken the
extra step to seek FAA approval and oversight. This certification means that
the school will have a properly modified training aircraft and use modern,
certified and inspected NVGs. It will usually mean that the instructors have
years of experience, which means that your pilots will receive an important
logbook endorsement for their training. Additionally, while inquiring with
the school about training, try to send tactical flight officers or
observers. Often, they can attend at a reduced rate, and it is worthwhile.
Modern law enforcement has many capabilities and missions
and continues to expand. Even if an operation is mostly an over-the-city
type operation, it should not rule out NVG capability. Consider the recent
blackouts and hurricanes like Rita and Katrina. Blackouts and natural
disasters inevitably happen, and there may be no artificial lights for
hundreds of miles. NVGs are the only safe alternative during these
situations. Approach the decision with education, and build safety into any
new capability. Accomplished properly, any agency can safely add NVG
capability.
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Reduce Aircraft Insurance Costs Through
Safety
By Pete Torrell
Vice President, Nation Air Insurance
Insurance brokers can help airborne law enforcement units
find the best insurance underwriter, and they can also help them organize
their unit in a way that will make them more insurable.
It is extremely important to select an experienced insurance broker that can
council a law enforcement agency on the necessary training requirements and
minimum experience that will be favorable to underwriting.
Finding the best broker also can have a large impact on
your insurance placement. You want your story told to the underwriting
community in the most accurate and favorable light possible. A good broker
will know which underwriters will be the best to talk to when searching for
coverage tailored to your unique requirements.
Many underwriters do not understand the risk well enough
to view airborne law enforcement units favorably. This could result in few
underwriters offering quotes. But if a respected broker presents your
insurance needs to the underwriters, you can expect more favorable terms and
more options.
A broker who is experienced in insuring airborne law
enforcement can give you guidance on how to improve operational areas that
affect your insurability. Suggestions for improvements may include
improvements to training facilities and practices. While budget constraints
for these departments vary widely, most budget for at least some annual
training provided by outside sources as a necessary cost of maintaining
safety. Underwriters frequently require such training to maintain a unit’s
insurability in addition to in-house training.
Another important issue is how and by whom aircraft are
maintained. What types of standards are being used to maintain military
surplus aircraft, and what type of experience does the mechanic have if
maintenance is not outsourced? It is preferable that law enforcement
departments also budget for mechanic training. Hopefully, the aircraft are
maintained and operated in a manner that is consistent with civilian
aircraft that have a standard airworthiness certificate. Departments
maintaining their aircraft to Part 135 standards, or at least to Part 91
standards, can help mitigate liability claims from third parties in the
event of an accident involving bodily injury or property damage.
A challenge we see for many units is that the unit
manager lacks sufficient aviation experience. This can result in uninformed
decisions that jeopardize safety and insurability. Safety is a culture that
starts at the top of any organization. Managers must be committed to
listening to trained professionals in areas they don’t fully understand and
be committed to creating a culture where information flows in both
directions. Proactive organizations will create a safety officer position
that would be responsible for the following:
-
Monitor and advise all operator safety activities that
have an impact on flight and ground safety
-
Formulate and initiate activities that stimulate and
maintain flight, maintenance and line service personnel’s interest in
safety
-
Facilitate safety meetings with all employees and
senior management
-
Develop safety accountability procedures
-
Conduct detailed safety audits to help identify
deficiencies and ensure established procedures are being followed
-
Improve safety policies and procedures
-
Manage the operator hazard identification and tracking
system
-
Monitor industry flight safety concerns having an
impact on operations
-
Maintain a safety awareness program (safety awareness
is the heart of any safety program)
-
Interface with aircraft manufacturers and industry
safety associations
-
Establish operator emergency response plan
-
Investigate incidents/accidents and make
recommendations to management to prevent a recurrence
-
Measure the results of initiatives
-
Meet with senior management each month to review the
status of the safety program
QUALIFICATIONS
The safety officer should have operational experience, normally achieved as
a crewmember, and receive training in the following:
-
Flight safety philosophy
-
Human factors and the decision making process
-
Accident prevention
-
Accident/incident management
-
Incident investigation
-
Safety management systems
-
The role of the safety officer as advisor to senior
management
-
Emergency response planning
In smaller departments, this person might have additional
responsibilities, including pilot duties. Your broker may be able to refer a
safety and loss control consultant to you. Some underwriters will provide
this consultant at no charge to you if your broker asks for the service.
A good unit manager can manage more effectively if he
does not let ego get in the way of making informed decisions. Hopefully,
managers that lack aviation safety experience will listen to input from
their chief pilot, safety manager and mechanic and trust their judgment.
Further improvements will result by sending the unit managers to an ALEA
management course. Hopefully, these unit managers will not be rotated into
other departments too quickly lest the decision-making process remain in a
continually inexperienced state.
It is important that your broker is familiar with your
safety program and is apprised of any new actions and improvements that have
been accomplished each year. This will ensure that you receive the benefit
of all credits available in the rating of your insurance premium.
The aviation insurance market is presently headed into a
more aggressive and competitive cycle. This is due to the return on
investments, current profitable insurance rates and overall favorable loss
experienced by the underwriters. Some of this has created incentives for new
underwriting facilities to start up, which will bring more competition to
the marketplace resulting in a downward trend in premium costs in the near
future.
A good aviation insurance broker will help you leverage
this situation to maximize your insurance value. The present market is an
opportunity to broaden your amount and types of coverage. This might include
admitted liability, including crew. This can serve as a valuable employee
benefit for crewmembers that find it expensive to purchase life insurance
because they are pilots. A suggested minimum is $250,000 per person,
including crew. It is also a good time to consider increasing liability
limits. There are many other extensions of coverage that are available at
little or no cost but are not given unless asked for. An experienced broker
will negotiate those into your placement.
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The TFO Role in Flight Safety
By Jack H. Schonely
LAPD Air Support Division
Situational awareness increases with an extra set of
trained eyes, as long as communication is open and encouraged between pilots
and their tactical flight officers (TFOs), crew chiefs and paramedics.
One of the many positive things the Sonoma County (CA)
Sheriff’s Department Air Unit practices with regards to safety is the
involvement of crewmembers in keeping the pilot informed. Their pilots
verbally request a sterile cockpit during departure and approach to the
airport, but they also request that the crew assist in collision avoidance
by calling out traffic and obstacles. This includes both the TFO in the
front left seat and the paramedic in the back. It works very well, and it is
the everyday practice of these professional aircrews.
When thinking about the safety of a flight, most would
picture a pilot at the controls making decisions and smoothly flying the
aircraft. The pilot ultimately is responsible for completing a safe flight;
however, he or she is only one piece of a larger puzzle that completes a
picture of safety in law enforcement aviation.
But before others – particularly TFOs – can contribute to
safety, they need to understand their role and receive information about the
aircraft, emergency procedures, obstacle avoidance, weather minimums,
collision avoidance and overall air crew coordination. But most importantly,
they need to know that they have a voice in the decision making process.
Let’s look at this in one of the most common scenarios
that aircrews face – the “Go, No Go” decision. Many aviation incidents and
accidents can be traced back to a poor choice to fly under a particular set
of circumstances. A pilot receives training in weather and certainly
understands FAA and agency weather minimums. The TFO should be briefed on
current and forecasted weather prior to start up, and he or she should raise
any concerns immediately. TFOs will not be as effective if they are
uncomfortable with the weather conditions. Their concerns should be
discussed with the pilot in command. In most cases, the pilot can ease
concerns by talking about the situation. The TFO’s concerns also may result
in the pilot slowing down and rethinking the decision to fly in marginal or
poor weather. This should be a crew decision for optimal safety.
In-flight emergencies can be very stressful and require
prompt, correct actions by the pilot for a safe conclusion. How many TFOs
carry an emergency procedure checklist with them in flight? This is a simple
practice that can dramatically increase safety during any procedure. It
allows the pilot to keep both hands on the controls and concentrate on the
emergency while the TFO looks up the procedure and reads it aloud. This is
particularly helpful during a situation involving hydraulics or any binding
of controls. In addition to reading out the procedure, the TFO should have
some familiarity with the various gauges so he or she can assist the pilot
in monitoring an instrument if requested to do so. This practice does not
require extensive training, but it can pay back big safety dividends if done
correctly.
Collision avoidance and obstacle avoidance are two areas
where the TFO also can make contributions to the safety of flight. The TFO
should never assume that a pilot has seen an aircraft or obstacle and speak
up and advise the pilot of what he or she sees. In many cases, accidents
occur when both the TFO and pilot’s eyes are locked into a situation on the
ground, and airborne objects, such as wires, are struck.
Open communication inside the cockpit is required for the
safe operation of aircraft. The pilot plays a large role in the success of
open communication by showing that he or she is receptive to observations
and ideas by fellow crewmembers. They should thank the TFO for pointing out
an obstacle and never imply that the TFO was foolish for pointing it out.
Invite the information, and this will establish a safe culture within the
cockpit that will apply to many other areas of safety and crew coordination.
Unit managers must set the tone for this safety culture
that involves both the pilot and the TFO. They must take the training of
TFOs seriously and not limit the training to FLIR and other mission
equipment. TFOs should be involved in safety training, crew resource
management and human factors training at every opportunity.
The pilot in command has many tasks and decisions that he
or she is ultimately responsible for. Pilots should make an informed and
correct decision in every aspect of each flight to complete it safely. Many
sources can provide that information, including maintenance books, DUATS,
preflight, information at roll call, prior training, experience and weather
observations. But do not forget the valuable source of safety information
sitting right next to you, the tactical flight officer.
Jack Schonely is a pilot with LAPD Air Support Division. He is a former
TFO and K-9 Handler and a frequent instructor for ALEA. His recently
released book entitled “Apprehending Fleeing Suspects” is available at his
website, www.officertactics.com.
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Threat & Error Management:
You Can’t Prevent
What You Can’t Predict!
By Craig E. Geis
California Training Institute
A detailed analysis of the law enforcement accidents over
the past 13 years shows that human factors accounted for more than 90
percent of the mishaps. That doesn’t mean that only the pilot made the
mistake. Maintenance professionals, manufacturers, management, etc., should
also be considered when addressing the issue of human factors.
Four factors are important to understanding the
interrelationship between discipline and safety: human error, negligent
conduct, reckless conduct and intentional rule violations. These categories
represent the principal labels we use socially and legally to describe
blameworthy conduct. One or more of these behavioral categories will be
applied in most mishap investigations, and the label often determines when
disciplinary sanction is appropriate. Here are some short descriptions of
these behavioral categories.
Human Error
Human error is a social label. It is generally agreed that the individual
should have taken an action other than what they took and, in the course of
that action, inadvertently caused or could have caused an undesirable
outcome. Human error is a term that we use to describe our everyday mistakes
or behavior – missing a radio call or forgetting to bring a piece of
equipment. The threshold for labeling behavior “human error” is very low –
we make errors every day with generally minimal consequences.
However, keep in mind that human errors can cause
catastrophic outcomes if the environment is unforgiving. Individuals and
organizations often view a serious, adverse outcome as more important than a
less serious one. This is known as outcome based behavior.
Some organizations and individuals focus on the outcome
of an act and not the behavior or the individual. Regardless of the
behavior, if the outcome is favorable, organizations often praise or reward
the individual. If the outcome is unsatisfactory, they often punish the
behavior, even when an honest mistake was made. But when looking at the
consequences for this behavior, remember that punishment is not effective,
because the behavior is unintentional. It is the normal byproduct of human
action. Better policies, procedures, SOPs, training, task selection and
structuring of the environment will make errors more unlikely to occur.
Negligent Conduct
Negligence, at least in social dialogue, is conduct subjectively more
culpable than human error. It is the failure to recognize a risk that should
have been recognized. In most cases, negligence is defined as failure to
exercise the skill, care and learning expected of a reasonably prudent
person. It is the objective determination that a person should have been
aware that they were taking a substantial and unjustifiable risk toward
causing an undesirable outcome. Accountability for one’s actions is
important; however, punishment in this case is usually not as effective as
training and increasing awareness so the individual can better assess the
risk.
Reckless Conduct
Reckless conduct, alternatively referred to as gross negligence, involves a
higher degree of culpability than negligence. Reckless conduct involves a
conscious disregard of risk. Reckless conduct differs from negligent conduct
in intent. Accountability in reckless conduct is critical. Since it involves
a conscious disregard of risk, additional training is almost useless. Since
the individual makes a conscious decision to disregard the risk, punishment
is often warranted and appropriate.
Intentional Rule Violations
Most rules, procedures and duties will require or prohibit specific
behavior. The intentional rule violation occurs when an individual chooses
to knowingly violate a rule while he/she is performing a task. This concept
is not necessarily related to risk taking, but merely shows that an
individual knew of or intended to violate a rule, procedure or duty in the
course of performing a task. Stopping this behavior is of paramount
importance.
While it only accounts for approximately 3 to 5 percent
of the mishaps investigated, the consequences and effect on the organization
and on the team are serious. These individuals usually have a pattern of
anti-authority behavior and often need to find a new line of work. Since
there was an intention to violate a rule, punishment is appropriate.
Training usually does no good because these individuals are often repeat
offenders and must be monitored carefully. Do not hesitate to remove them
from the organization.
If you look at airborne law enforcement accidents, you
will find that very few are the result of reckless conduct and intentional
rule violation. That leaves human error and negligent conduct to consider.
Remember that, in these cases, training is the remedy.
The primary objective of training should be to help
individuals better understand why human error occurs so their awareness
increases and the individual can better assess the risks. Individuals need
to have a clear understanding of the source of errors in order to predict
what may happen, and then take proactive measures to avoid the error. In
most law enforcement organizations, this training should address pilots,
tactical flight officers, other crewmembers and maintenance personnel. Human
factors training has become an industry standard and is mandatory for all
FAR 121 and 135 crews.
To help us better target the training, see the table at
right for a more in-depth look at the root causes of the law enforcement
accidents for the past 13 years. Also listed are several key points in each
error of human error. This analysis does not include those accidents that
are still under review with cause factors pending. Due to multiple cause
factors in some incidents, the total is greater than 100 percent. For
example, management may fail to properly supervise maintenance, and
maintenance may use an improper procedure. Both factors would be considered
in the analysis.
With this data at hand, training can address the relevant
error threat. The most effective training program to address these issues
includes the following areas:
-
Accident Causation – Root Cause Analysis
-
Threat and Error Management
-
Information Processing
-
Stress and Performance
-
Fatigue
-
Situational Awareness
-
Developing a Mental Model
-
Interruptions and Distractions
-
Habit Patterns
-
Deferred Tasks
-
Sidetracking
-
Preoccupation
-
Channeled Attention to Fixation
-
Behavior Triggers
-
Decision Making
-
Effective Communication
The goal of human factors threat and error management
training is to better help our team members predict, detect, avoid and
recover from error. It accomplishes this by helping individuals better
understand why human error occurs so their awareness increases and the
individual can better employ human error risk management strategies.
Pilot Human Factors Key Points
While they account for 33 percent of the human factor mishaps, most flight
skill errors result from a judgment error, which puts the pilot/aircraft in
a situation that makes recovery difficult with normal skills. Therefore, you
won’t fix the problem by seeking a training program. Skill training is
obviously important, but consider targeting some of your budget on those
areas that represent the greatest risk.
Most of the non-compliance errors reviewed go beyond
simple human error, as defined earlier.
Most controlled flight into terrain and spatial
disorientation mishaps start with a judgment error to proceed into marginal
conditions, and the pilot does not have a plan or the skill to recover.
Most loss of tail rotor effectiveness mishaps start with
a judgment error that puts the aircraft in a situation that requires too
much power to recover.
Most supervision mishaps occur during training where the
instructor fails to properly supervise the student or allows them to exceed
A/C limits, making recovery difficult.
Material Failure: 33%
Most loss of engine power mishaps occur in military
aircraft. Since 1999, 54 percent were in certificated aircraft. In most
cases the cause was not determined and when tested, the engines ran fine.
Pilots flying military surplus aircraft should be prepared at all times for
a forced landing.
Component failures are balanced between
maintenance-related causes and just plain material failure.
Maintenance Human Factors: 9%
These are mostly caused by not following approved
procedures and failure of a good quality assurance check after maintenance
has been performed.
Management Human Factors: 11%
Management is responsible for planning, organizing,
directing, controlling and staffing of the entire flight operation. In 11
percent of the mishaps, management failed in these responsibilities.
This figure may be skewed by the fact that, in many
cases, management of law enforcement agencies is performed by non-pilots,
and by default some of those management functions reside with the line
pilots.
A safety officer is the manager’s best tool in this area. They can keep
management up to date on problems, and a good safety program can provide the
commander with the tools to effectively manage the unit, even if they are
not pilots.
Manufacturer Human Error: 4%
When in doubt about a procedure, check it out thoroughly
before proceeding.
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What Should Safety Leadership Look Like In
Your Organization?
By Roger Baker
President of Safety Focus Group, LLC
When asked, almost every person working in aviation
organizations will tell you that the number one value and priority is
safety. When pressed to explain how employees would prove that value to an
outsider, they sometimes hang their heads and begin to fidget in their
chairs.
An outsider could examine the aircraft, facilities,
training, maintenance and other obvious signs of a safe organization.
However, these indicators do not necessarily mean that a positive safety
culture exists in that organization. A positive safety culture exists only
when the management and staff know that each employee does the right thing,
for the right reason, at the right time, every time.
As an example, suppose pilots see a thunderstorm in the
distance (maybe 50 nautical miles or greater) and know that they should
avoid the center and edges of the storm (the “right thing”) in order to
prevent discomfort to the passengers and damage to the aircraft (for the
“right reasons”). The pilots plan to skirt the storm widely from the
distance of 50 miles (at the “right time”), as opposed to waiting until they
begin to feel turbulence and rain as they enter the storm.
In another situation, a maintenance technician might know
that he must work on an aircraft structure that is high off the ground. He
should procure the proper work stand (right thing) because it will correctly
support him and his tools (right reason). The technician brings the stand to
the aircraft before beginning the job (right time), rather than when his
stepladder feels uncomfortable during the task.
These examples suggest that organizations should not only
put safety into practice when someone is watching, when it is easy,
convenient or at no cost. Organizations should constantly put safety into
practice because it is the right thing for the right reasons at the right
time. When this is typical performance and not the exception, then the
organization has achieved a positive safety culture.
So how do you develop leadership to spawn this change in
an organization and move from a reactive safety culture to a proactive
positive safety culture? Three simple steps can make it happen.
The leaders and safety managers must evaluate the current
state of the organization and where they want it to be in the future. This
evaluation should examine the existing levels of teamwork and workgroup
relations, the level of fairness and credibility of supervisors and
managers, communications and the value that the organization places on
safety.
The organization should identify leadership traits that
should be enhanced. Such areas include vision, management credibility,
teamwork, accountability, communication, action and providing feedback and
recognition to the workforce.
After creating a specific plan of action and a clear
vision of the safety culture goals and objectives, the organization needs to
develop a positive plan to enhance the skills of supervisors, managers, and
safety professionals to meet its safety strategic goals and objectives.
Putting the cultural changes outlined above into practice
takes vision, a willingness to recognize shortcomings and a clear design for
management and supervisor skill enhancements. Change leads to additional
risk, however, it also brings great opportunities for improvement.
This process is hard work and cannot be undertaken
without strong commitment. The process might require that the organization
seek outside assistance with steps one and two. After developing a plan, the
organization may require additional outside assistance in teaching the
management and supervisors the skills necessary to improve the safety
culture.
Most aviation organizations perform the operational
requirements of aircraft and passenger movements well, however, many are not
well equipped enough to bring positive change to the safety culture.
Although most managers and supervisors grow into the job, after being picked
from the general workforce, they require professional, formalized training
in people and management skills in order to strengthen their abilities to
lead in critical safety areas.
Many managers and supervisors believe they are too busy
for classroom training, and ego can keep them from admitting they need skill
enhancements. But if they truly wish to change the culture, they must first
change themselves. Pretending to already have the necessary knowledge and
skills will inevitably delay the change process.
Roger Baker is president of Safety Focus Group, LLC. The company
specializes in safety audits and training, team performance, and safety
consulting. He retired from the FAA after 29 years as a safety professional.
(Back to top)
So, Who Does Train the Trainer?
By Randy Rowles
Bell Helicopter
In a quest for a homework free weekend, a determined
nine-year-old once offered me an interesting challenge. He looked me square
in the eyes and said, “I bet the teacher doesn’t have any homework!” Of
course, I explained that the teacher had tests to grade and classroom
preparation to do for the next week. This little exercise of mental chess
certainly got me thinking about aviation's instructor corps. The question
that came to mind – so, who does train the trainer?
As a flight instructor, you have 24 months until you must
renew your certificate. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) offers a
high pass rate of applicants through instructional activity and personal
knowledge of instructors, among other things. In addition, an instructor
also has the option of attending a 16-hour Flight Instructor Refresher
Clinic (FIRC). The FIRC is an FAA-approved program that provides detailed
instruction on the “how to’s” of instructing and a comprehensive review of
material such as Federal Aviation Regulations, weather and other important
information. Many FIRCs are available online and provide a convenient method
of compliance for instructors to renew their certificates.
However, FIRCs only meet the ground portion of FAR 61.56
Flight Review requirements. The instructor must then meet a proficiency
check by either completing the flight review portion or passing an operating
certificate holder check (i.e. 135.293/299 check ride) or other pilot
certificate check in accordance FAR 61.56.
Essentially, the instructor is not required to
demonstrate instructional competency; only pilot competency at the level of
the certificate they hold is required. Within this line of thinking, you
must assume that there is no loss of capability or degradation of
instructional skills with time. Is it safe to conclude that once you obtain
your instructor certificate, you will never again need flight training
related to the safe and effective transfer of flight skills and related
procedures? To make the assumption as described, you must believe that the
training program of the instructor was adequate to support life-long
instructional knowledge and flight proficiency. We all know that the human
element will not allow this to be true. It is not by chance that human
factor related accidents account for over 70 percent of the accidents in
general aviation.
Several universities have done studies on retention of
information through their student body. One study enrolled 50 students,
verifying that each had minimal knowledge of the subject matter to be
presented. The class was a short, condensed one-hour presentation on
material that carried both exciting and benign information. The class met
again every week for a period of eight weeks to take an examination on the
material presented. As you would expect, every week the retention of the
material presented varied among the participants. Out of all of the
participants, the average retention level was less than 20 percent by week
eight.
We must accept the fact that without remedial
instruction, our proficiency and knowledge base will degrade. Many
instructors that I have spoken with on the matter use self-study as their
method of updating new information or reviewing subject matter that they
haven’t used in a while. There is no doubt that self-study is a powerful and
effective tool, but a common misconception is that self-study is
all-inclusive, and no other training is needed.
Although study time is required to fully grasp material,
it is fully dependent on the individual perception of the material. How many
times have you sent an email to someone only to have him or her perceive
your intent incorrectly? If the email was the only communication, your
message may have been lost in translation. But if a meeting took place to
review the material contained in the email, you would have the opportunity
to direct the perception of the individual down the intended path. Attending
a periodic instructional session such as an FIRC provides both the material
review and an evaluation opportunity to the instructor.
When was the last time you were really evaluated? For
many instructors, it was many, many years ago. An evaluation is healthy in
our business. It is a deterrent to complacency and provides purpose to our
own training initiatives. In addition, evaluations provide a method of
standardization. The Practical Test Standards are an example of maintaining
a standard through evaluation. It shouldn’t matter who administers the
evaluation, the standard should remain the same.
While I was conducting a Private Pilot examination a few
weeks ago, the applicant asked, “is it scary to get in an aircraft with
someone you don’t know and do these maneuvers?” I explained that you never
let your guard down and effective communication is essential. I thought
about those that I do pay special attention to, and some of the most
unpredictable pilots I have flown with were high time ATPs and CFIs. The
reason is simply, when they make a mistake, they do it with vigilance.
Making mistakes with confidence, to the untrained eye, can seem as though
the pilot intentionally put the aircraft in a bad situation. This is not
often the case, as the individual is only doing what they think is correct
at the time.
The helicopter industry is unique with regard to the
qualifications of the instructor corps. Often, a student becomes a
instructor without the benefit of industry experience or knowledge. In the
normal flow of a civilian helicopter pilot career, teaching is often the
first employment opportunity available. It goes without saying that some of
the instructors that accept this type of position really don’t want to be
there in the first place. Who really pays the price in this situation? The
student will suffer in most cases.
When training to be an instructor, you focus mostly on
teaching – essentially how to effectively transfer information and fly a
helicopter. Once you obtain your CFI, you no longer get in an aircraft with
a pilot that only pretends not to be able to fly. This person really can’t
fly the helicopter and has no idea of what to do or not to do. They may just
let go of the controls for no reason, roll off the throttle or just lock up
on the controls with a bear grip that you can’t overpower.
This is what students do. They learn by making mistakes.
You are asking them to make mistakes because you are teaching them to do
something they don’t know how to do. On top of that, they have no idea what
the margin of safety is for the aircraft or maneuver you are training for.
If you take a new student and tell them you are going to demonstrate a
hovering autorotation from 25 feet in a Robinson R22, on the first one they
will be happy to ride along. It is called blind faith.
Flight instruction is a tricky business. It requires the
instructor to always anticipate a mistake when the opportunity for a mistake
takes place. It is very common to teach a hovering autorotation immediately
after having taught straight-in autorotations. In this case, you should
expect the student to immediately lower the collective. They will push that
collective down with all their might because you, the instructor, have
taught them “when entering an autorotation, the collective goes down."
Luckily, this is easily corrected for if you recognize the opportunity for
the mistake.
You must think each maneuver through and identify where,
when and why these mistake opportunities can take place. Some potential risk
mitigators are placing your foot against the pedal that you want them to
apply during the entry to an autorotation. This will allow the student to
make a correct pedal input, but stop the outward deflection of the pedal if
they make an input of the incorrect pedal. Also, keep your hand on the
collective, or "up stick." If the student lowers or raises the collective at
the wrong moment, you are prepared to act immediately.
This is what the industry calls training the trainer. The
question you must ask yourself before you get in an aircraft with any
student is “Am I prepared?” Have you been taught all of the “what if’s” of
your craft?
Remember, we break many more aircraft training for
aircraft malfunctions than actual aircraft malfunctions. Learn what
maneuvers can bite you and what point of the maneuver is the most critical.
One maneuver that comes to mind is stuck pedals. This
maneuver is inherently dangerous because it has the mistake opportunity of
conducting a run-on landing with the skids not in line with the landing
surface. My question is, “If the maneuver is taught correctly, and the
student can get the aircraft to a safe altitude of five feet or so above the
landing surface, wouldn’t that satisfy the task?” Many times we continue to
a point in a maneuver not because of value added to the student but our own
pride. The instructor must know their limitations and apply those to the
maneuvers and techniques of their methods.
No matter who you fly with, you need to know how to
identify red flags. A red flag is simply a sign, a point in time that the
instructor connects with the demonstrated performance of the student.
Usually when a maneuver is going south, the instructor will begin to
identify problems areas, such as airspeed, altitude, sink rate or other
issues that will have a negative effect on the outcome or safety of the
maneuver. These issues are red flags. To be an effective flight instructor,
you must know your machine and how to identify red flags. This is where I
find the greatest void in instructor’s credentials. Many instructors never
receive how-to-teach training in models of aircraft other than in the
machine they received their flight instructor examination. It is not
uncommon for a pilot that holds a flight instructor certificate to become
the designated IP in an air wing or flight department. Without the
instruction necessary to properly identify red flags specific to new models
of aircraft, the lessons learned can be very costly.
So when you take your annual factory training or whatever
training program you are on, request a review of your flight instructor
skills related to your aircraft. Sit in the appropriate seat and have your
instructor point out where and when mistake opportunities can take place.
Ask the question, “How should I teach this maneuver?” Don’t be intimidated
or embarrassed to ask these questions. Remember, your safety and reputation
depend on it.
Randy Rowles is an instructor pilot with Bell Helicopter Textron. In
addition to being a Designated Pilot Examiner, He is a Master Flight
Instructor by NAFI and the Chairman of the HAI Flight Training Committee
with over 10,000 hours of helicopter experience.
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